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States Take the Wheel—Green Mountain Chrysler
Plymntouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie Gives States a Chance
to Choose the Direction of Their Automobile Emissions
Regulation
I. Introduction
In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, the United
States District Court for the District of Vermont decided the first of several
cases across the United States addressing state regulation of automobile
greenhouse gas emissions.   In these cases, automobile manufacturers and1
dealerships challenged state regulations adopted pursuant to a specific waiver
provision under the Clean Air Act (CAA) claiming the state regulations were
preempted by federal law.   In a landmark victory for environmentalists, the2
United States Supreme Court recently held in Massachusetts v. EPA  that
greenhouse gas regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
pursuant to the CAA was not preempted.   Expanding upon the Supreme3
Court’s decision, the court in Crombie held that states were not preempted
from regulating greenhouse gases through the CAA waiver provisions.   In4
another success to be celebrated by environmentalists and, in this case, states’
rights advocates, Crombie reveals the beginning of the states’ struggle to
regain control over environmental policy that is necessary to combat global
warming. 
As a result of increasing public awareness of the causal connection between
man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, both the federal
government and state governments have attempted to enact more stringent
standards regulating greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution.   The threat5
of global warming demands a swift and effective governmental response, as
the effects of climate change are becoming more difficult to ignore.  6
Greenhouse gases can cause serious problems ranging from degraded water
quality and low water supply to disasters of Hurricane Katrina proportion.  7
Legislatures have reacted by targeting automobiles with progressively more
stringent automobile emissions pollution regulations, in large part because “the
1. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300 (D. Vt. 2007).
2. Id. at 300-01. 
3. 549 U.S. 497, 529-30 (2007).
4. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 397-98.
5. Steven G. Davison, Regulation of Emission of Greenhouse Gases and Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Motor Vehicles, 1 PITTSBURGH J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 1, 2 (2006).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 4.
669
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United States transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere.”   As federal and state regulations increase, courts8
across the United States have been called upon to decide issues of federalism
and preemption that arise in automobile air quality litigation and
environmental law.   9
Historically, regulation of air pollution fell within the states’ police power,
but political pressure from industry and influential polluters caused many
states to set extremely low standards or no standards at all.   If standards were10
enacted, they were often unenforced with no penalties for noncompliant
polluters.  In the mid-twentieth century, however, the federal government
began to enact mandatory federal standards for air pollution regulation.   The11
sudden creation of numerous federal laws led to conflict between existing state
regulations and the new national standards for air pollution control.   Under12
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, however, federal law
preempts any state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to” federal law.  13
With broad acts such as the Air Quality Act (AQA) and the Clean Air Act
(CAA), the federal government has taken the primary power to regulate air
pollution from the states with a few limited exceptions.   These federal14
regulations embody a new system of cooperative federalism—establishing
federally mandated nationwide standards and delegating the power of
implementation and enforcement to the states.   States retain significant power15
in implementing the federal program, but the overall scope and requirements
for air pollution regulation are determined federally.   If the states fail to meet16
the federal standards, the federal government regains the power of
implementation and enforcement to ensure that states attain federal
environmental standards.17
One significant exception to Congress’s reign over the field of air pollution
regulation is the waiver granted to the State of California by the 1967
8. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524. 
9. Cases involving state regulation of automobile emissions win the “prize for creating the
longest-running, most contentious environmental preemption disputes.”  ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 329 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004).
10. Id. at 316-17.  
11. Id. at 292-93.
12. Id.
13. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2).
14. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 297.
15. Id. at 305.
16. Id. at 305-06.
17. Id. at 306.
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amendments to the Clean Air Act.   This waiver granted the State of18
California the right to establish its own automobile emission standards, so long
as such standards are more stringent than federal standards and meet additional
federal requirements.   In 1967, Congress also authorized other states to adopt19
California’s standards so long as they were substantively identical and met the
same additional federal requirements.   Congress’s grant of power to state20
governments to regulate air pollution more stringently than required by federal
standards has been important to the success of automobile emissions pollution
regulations and also has been the source of a significant amount of litigation
relating to the relationship between automobile emissions pollution standards
and federally mandated fuel economy standards.   21
In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, automobile
manufacturers and dealerships challenged the State of Vermont’s 2005
adoption of the most recent California standard adopted in 2004.   The22
manufacturers and dealerships claimed that standards set under the California
waiver were preempted by federal law under the Environmental Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA) and the CAA.   In Crombie, the United23
States District Court for the District of Vermont considered whether the waiver
for California, and other states adopting California’s standards, has the effect
of federal law or whether it is a state regulation with the possibility of
preemption by federal statutes.   The court held that the standard under the24
California waiver provision for automobile emissions pollution regulation had
the effect of federal law and, therefore, could not be preempted by other
federal laws regulating fuel economy.   Alternatively, the court held that if the25
waiver provisions did not have the effect of federal law, the waiver did not
impermissibly conflict with federal law and was not preempted.26
Consequently, automobile manufacturers and dealerships must adhere to the
State of California’s automobile emissions pollution regulations and the
regulations of other states adopting California’s standards.   The court’s27
decision in Crombie reinforces the necessary structure of cooperative
federalism in environmental regulation and prevents slight statutory overlap
from rendering ineffective the powerful waiver provisions that Congress
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000); see also PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 329.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
20. Id. § 7507.
21. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 329. 
22. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300, 338 (D. Vt. 2007).
23. Id. at 301.
24. Id. at 303.
25. Id. at 398.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 398-99.
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intended states to wield against automobile emission pollution.  As such, on
appeal, Crombie should be upheld and heralded as an instructive model for
other courts faced with challenges against similar state legislation.
Part II of this note introduces the structure of cooperative federalism and its
relation to the doctrine of preemption as applied to both federal and state laws. 
Part II also summarizes the legislative history of the CAA and the EPCA,
along with the difficulties arising from solely federal regulation of air pollution
that led to the specific waiver provision for California and the subsequent
waiver for any state that adopts the California regulations.  Part III discusses
the procedural and factual history of Crombie, as well as the court’s decision
relative to the issues of federal preemption and the statutory waiver, along with
the possible future of the case on appeal.  Part IV concludes with an analysis
of the district court’s refusal to allow slight statutory overlap which would
prevent necessary environmental regulation from functioning properly and
undermining the effective structure of cooperative federalism in the regulation
of automobile emission pollution regulation.  This note concludes with Part V.
II. Law Before the Case
In Crombie, the United States District Court for the District of Vermont
considered whether the Clean Air Act’s (CAA’s) waiver for California and
others states constitutes federal or state law.   Additionally, the court28
examined how the waiver may be affected by preemption under the EPCA.  29
Prior to analyzing the specific issue of the California waiver and the possibility
of preemption by the EPCA, the court first examined the history and purpose
of the CAA, the EPCA, and of the waiver provision itself.   The court applied30
reasoning derived from the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in
Massachusetts v. EPA and expanded the Supreme Court’s holding to
determine how the doctrine of preemption specifically relates to automobile
emissions pollution regulations and the California waiver provisions.   The31
28. Id. at 300-01.
29. Id. at 301.
30. Id. at 303-07. 
31. Id. at 344 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).  In Massachusetts v.
EPA, a group of states, local governments, and environmental organizations petitioned for
review of an order of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denying a petition for
rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act
(CAA).  549 U.S. at 514.  The Supreme Court had three primary holdings: (1) the state of
Massachusetts had standing to petition for review; (2) the CAA authorized the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the event that it forms a “judgment” that
such emissions contribute to climate change; and (3) the EPA can avoid taking regulatory action
with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles only if it determines that
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/6
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Crombie court’s decision relied considerably upon the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the historical context of cooperative federalism, preemption, the
federal regulations, and the California waiver.32
A. Federalism and Environmental Regulation
During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States became increasingly
concerned with the negative impact that human actions can have on the
environment.   This realization led to an enhanced federal involvement in33
what was once a primarily state-governed arena.   As the federal government34
became more active in regulating environmental issues, a new system emerged
with both state and federal governments actively participating in the regulation
and enforcement of new environmental statutes.   Most major environmental35
legislation conformed to the general format of cooperative federalism—the
federal government established a mandatory national standard and required
states to take the proper steps to implement programs and enforcement
mechanisms to ensure compliance with the national standards.   This system36
minimized two of the major problems associated with individual states
enacting pollution regulations—specifically automobile emissions standards. 
The first problem resulted from states approaching automobile emissions
differently based on the automobile industry’s role within their state.   States37
with automobile factories encountered strong political pressure to avoid
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do. 
Id.
XXOf particular relevance to the court in Crombie is the Supreme Court’s analysis of the
interplay between fuel economy standards under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) and automobile emissions pollution regulations under the CAA.  The EPA argued that
it “could not regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles because doing so would
require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to the EPA) that Congress has assigned”
to the Department of Transportation (DOT) through the EPCA.  Id. at 531-32.  The Court
rejected this argument and held that the “EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s
‘health’ and ‘welfare,’ a statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote
energy efficiency.  The two obligations may overlap, but there is no reason to think the two
agencies cannot both administer their obligations and yet avoid inconsistency.”  Id. (citations
omitted).  This legal reasoning provides a foundation for the Vermont District Court’s decision
relating to the EPCA and the CAA waiver provision in Crombie.
32. See generally Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497).
33. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 294. 
34. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 303-04.
35. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 305-06.
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 296-300.
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stringent automobile emissions pollution regulations and to set less
burdensome standards.   Many states did not set stringent standards out of38
concern that industry would relocate and new industry would choose a location
with fewer regulatory burdens.   Other states, such as California, which39
suffered from smog and air pollution resulting from heavy car emissions in
populous cities, set more stringent automobile emissions standards that were
more difficult for automobile manufacturers to meet.   Thus, state control over40
emission standards resulted in regulatory inconsistency and difficult
enforcement problems for the states and the federal government.41
The inconsistency created by different state standards for automobile
emissions pollution created a second problem for the regulation of automobile
emissions.  With emission standards varying among the states, automobile
manufacturers and dealerships were confronted with a broad array of
requirements along with the burden and expense of complying with each
individual state’s regulations.   As a result, automobile manufacturers strongly42
advocated for the creation of a federal emission standard in a system of
cooperative federalism.   Although the federal standard was more stringent43
than some state standards, to the automobile manufacturers, the burden of
compliance with the federal regulatory scheme was easily outweighed by the
benefit of having only one standard to consider and implement in their
automobile designs.44
B. Clean Air Act and California Waiver Provision
Responding to the need for an all-encompassing federal standard for
automobile emissions, Congress modified the already existing CAA that
regulated air pollution by passing the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act
of 1965 (MVAPCA).  The MVAPCA was included in the amended CAA and
established a national automobile emissions standard, but it did not include
express language removing states’ rights to establish state standards.   When45
the states continued setting their own regulations despite the federal standard
enacted in the MVAPCA, Congress amended the CAA to include an express
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 299-300.
41. Id.
42. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 293,
294 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
43. Id.
44. Id. at 293.




preemption clause to prevent states from enacting their own automobile
emissions standards.   The new addition, Title II of the CAA, became known46
as the National Emissions Standards Act (NESA).47
NESA, however, did not entirely remove states’ rights to set automobile
emissions pollution standards.  The amendments included a specific waiver
provision for the State of California.   California had been setting more48
stringent and progressive automobile emissions pollution standards since the
early 1950s.   One of the primary reasons Congress included a preemption49
clause in the CAA was California’s continued efforts to set its own stricter
standards after the federal standard was established.   Under the NESA50
waiver, California is allowed to continue setting its own emission standards so
long as they are more stringent than the federal standards.   California must51
also show that the adopted standards are not arbitrary or capricious, address
compelling and extraordinary conditions, and are consistent with the federal
standards and policy.52
As concern over pollution and environmental issues grew, other states also
sought increased power to regulate automobile emissions pollution within their
borders.   In 1977, Congress amended the CAA to include a “piggyback”53
waiver for states desiring to adopt standards identical to California’s, so long
as both California and other states seeking a waiver adopted the standards at
least two years before the commencement of the automobile model year to be
regulated.   Under the “piggyback waiver,” California and states wishing to54
adopt California’s standards must apply to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for approval of the state standard based on the statutory
requirements of the waiver.   The waivers provide a means for states that55
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).  This provision states: 
No state or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines subject to this part.  No state shall require certification,
inspection or any other approval relating to the control of emissions from any new
motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to the initial
sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine,
or equipment.
Id.
47. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
49. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 329.
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
52. Id.
53. Motor Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
55. Id. §§ 7543(b), 7507. 
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desire more stringent regulations than those enacted by the federal government
to protect their states from automobile emissions pollution.56
C. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
During the same period of increasing environmental regulation that led to
the CAA and the MVAPCA, Congress enacted the EPCA in response to the
energy crisis of the 1970s.   The EPCA’s goal was to “provide for improved57
energy efficiency of motor vehicles,” and one of its primary functions was to
set national fuel economy standards for automobiles.   The authority to set58
fuel economy standards was given to the Secretary of Transportation who then
delegated the authority to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).   Because the fuel economy standards were not enacted for59
environmental purposes, the EPA has no authority over the fuel economy
standards, their implementation, or enforcement.60
Under the EPCA, NHTSA enacts “fleet-wide average fuel economy
standards that . . . apply to all passenger automobiles or light-duty trucks
sold . . . in a given year . . . .”   These standards are known as Corporate61
Average Fuel Economy or “CAFE” standards.   Currently, the EPCA62
establishes broad guidelines but requires that NHTSA consider four general
factors when setting the CAFE standards.   NHTSA is required to consider63
“technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy.”   When considering these factors and64
establishing fuel economy standards, the EPCA gives NHTSA broad
discretion.65
When the EPCA was initially passed, Congress required that “other Federal
motor vehicle standards” be considered as one of the four statutory factors
when setting national fuel economy standards.   The EPCA was recodified in66
1994, and now requires that the NHTSA consider the “effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy,” changing from its
56. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 329.
57. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 305
(D. Vt. 2007).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 6201.
59. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
60. Id. at 347.
61. Id. at 306.
62. Id.
63. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000).
64. Id.
65. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2002(e)(3) (1988), repealed by 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss3/6
2008] NOTES 677
previous language only slightly.   Congress also provided that the technical67
modifications made to the EPCA during its recodification were intended to
revise, codify, and enact the law “without substantive change.”   Like the68
CAA, the EPCA includes a broad preemption provision that precludes any
state government from adopting or enforcing “a law or regulation related to
fuel economy standards . . . for automobiles covered by an average fuel
economy standard” under the Act.   Thus, the relationship between the69
California waiver, the CAA, and the EPCA governs the preemption issue
before the court in Crombie.
D. Preemption
To determine the permissibility of the California waiver provision under the
CAA and the “piggyback statute” allowing other states to adopt California’s
standards, the Crombie court had to consider the possibility of preemption.  70
In the United States, federalism allows both state and federal governments to
enact legislation.   As a result, there is a possibility that state law could71
contradict federal law, necessitating a determination of which law will govern
in such an instance.  The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution created the
doctrine of preemption and established that federal law “shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”   The doctrine of preemption holds that when a state law72
impermissibly infringes on federal law, the state law is preempted and is
unconstitutional.73
If the waiver provisions are afforded the effect of federal law, preemption
analysis is unnecessary because federal law is not capable of preemption by
other federal law.   Preemption is not implicated if federal laws conflict or74
appear to conflict with each other.   If, however, the regulations adopted75
67. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).  This section states:
When an average fuel economy standard prescribed under this chapter is in effect,
a State or political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a law or
regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy standards
for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under this chapter.
Id.
68. S. REP. NO. 103-265, at 1 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-180, at 1 (1993) as reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 818.
69. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (emphasis added).
70. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
71. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 327.
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 343 (D. Vt. 2007) (citing Hillsborough County, Fla. v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 344.
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through the waiver provisions are considered state law, preemption analysis
will determine whether the overlap between the state regulations and the
federal law is permissible. 
When considering the permissibility of overlap between a state law and a
federal law, courts utilize a standard preemption analysis of the issue.  In order
to be effective in the United States, federalism demands a general presumption
against preemption unless it is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.  76
Thus, when courts consider the possibility of preemption, the touchstone is
primarily congressional purpose and intent.   Preemption analysis requires77
consideration of the three general categories of federal preemption: express,
implied, and conflict preemption.78
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption of state law requires express or explicit preemptive
language within the applicable federal statute.   If there is an express79
preemption provision, such as in the CAA and the EPCA, the plain wording
of the provision is the first focus of the preemption analysis as it “necessarily
contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”   If the plain80
language of the statute is insufficient to provide evidence of Congress’s intent,
then courts consider the the legislative history of the statute.   In Crombie, the81
United States District Court for the District of Vermont encountered the issue
of express preemption as a result of the CAA clause prohibiting state
regulation of automobile emissions pollution and the EPCA clause prohibiting
state regulation of fuel economy standards.  These clauses must only be
reconciled with the waiver provision if it is considered a state regulation.82
2. Field Preemption
Field preemption occurs when the scheme of federal regulation is so
pervasive as to leave no room for supplementary state regulation.   Congress’s83
intent must be clear and manifest indicating that it intended the federal
government to regulate a certain field exclusive of state regulation.   The84
76. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
77. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l
Ass’n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
78. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350, 354-55.
79. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 243 (2007).
80. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 351 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 664 (1993)).
81. Id. at 353.
82. Id. at 351.
83. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 79, § 243.
84. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
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federal regulation of the field must be pervasive and “so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject.”   Field preemption is based almost entirely on the85
congressional intent behind the federal regulations.   Because both the EPCA86
and the CAA have express preemption clauses, there is no need to address
whether Congress had the requisite intent to preempt state regulations, thus
field preemption is the least relevant type of preemption analysis for the CAA
and the EPCA.
3. Conflict Preemption
Even if the waiver provisions are not found to be expressly preempted by
the EPCA, courts could find an impermissible conflict between the regulations
under the California waiver and the federally mandated fuel economy
standards.  Conflict preemption occurs “where either (a) compliance with both
state and federal law is impossible, or (b) a state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”87
Conflict preemption operates similarly to implied preemption, as neither
requires express statutory language to establish preemption.   In order to find88
that a state law impermissibly conflicts with federal law, the conflict must
exhibit more than mere tension or possession of different objectives.   The89
presumption against preemption requires that courts find an actual conflict that
would make it impossible to satisfactorily comply with both statutes.   Thus,90
for a court to find that the waiver provisions impermissibly conflict with the
federal statutes, the conflict preemption analysis must reveal that the waiver
provisions and the fuel economy standards cannot coexist without impeding
congressional objectives.91
85. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
86. PLATER ET AL., supra note 9, at 328.
87. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 79, § 243; see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 492 (1987); Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985).
88. 16A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 79, § 243.
89. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
90. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000).
91. Id.
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III. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie
A. Background and Procedural History
In 2004, California adopted new comprehensive standards for regulating
automobile greenhouse gas emissions and applied to the EPA for a waiver as
provided by the CAA.   Subsequently, Vermont adopted the same standard92
and applied for a waiver in 2005.   A group of automobile manufacturers and93
dealerships opposed the adoption of the Vermont regulations and challenged
the regulations’ validity in Crombie.   The possibility of individual states94
adopting increasingly more stringent standards strengthened the automobile
industry’s desire for one general federal standard, and the industry decided to
fight the waiver provisions in court.  Similar cases emerged in other states that
chose to adopt California’s standards.   The automobile manufacturers and95
dealerships  alleged that the regulations adopted by Vermont constituted state96
regulations that impermissibly conflicted with federal law prohibiting state
regulation of automobile emissions pollution and state regulation of
automobile fuel economy standards.   The plaintiffs sued George Crombie,97
the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, along with several
other environmental officials of the State of Vermont for injunctive relief and
a declaratory judgment based on two claims of federal preemption: express and
implied preemption under the EPCA and conflict preemption under the
amended CAA.98
92. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302, 338 (discussing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1
(2007)).
93. Id. at 302, 338-39.
94. Id. at 300-01.
95. Id. at 301 n.3.
96. The plaintiffs are: Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep; Green Mountain
Ford Mercury; Joe Tornabene’s GMC; Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; DaimlerChrysler
Corporation; and General Motors Corporation.  Id. at 301 n.1.
97. Id. at 301.
98. Id.  The plaintiffs also alleged violation of the CAA, foreign policy preemption,
violation of the dormant commerce clause, and violation of the Sherman Act.  Id.  The claims
of violation of the CAA, violation of the dormant commerce clause and violation of the
Sherman Act were later dismissed by plaintiffs.  Id.  The foreign policy preemption claim was
discussed, but it is not relevant to the specific issues of federal preemption discussed in this
note.  Id. at 392.
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Initially, the defendants  sought dismissal of the case for lack of subject99
matter jurisdiction and requested a judgment on the pleadings because the
waiver sought by Vermont had not yet been approved by the EPA.   The100
United States District Court for the District of Vermont concluded that there
was subject matter jurisdiction and held that the case should proceed under the
assumption that the waiver would be granted.   If the waiver was not granted101
following the case, then Vermont’s regulation of automobile emissions
pollution without an EPA waiver would automatically be preempted as an
impermissible state regulation under the CAA.   The defendants also asked102
the court to stay the case pending resolution of a case in California involving
the same issues before the court in Crombie.   Further, the defendants103
requested another stay of the proceedings pending resolution of Massachusetts
v. EPA before the United States Supreme Court because it addressed a similar
issue as to whether federal automobile emissions pollution standards relating
to greenhouse gases conflict with fuel economy standards under the EPCA.  104
Both requests for stays were denied by the United States District Court of the
District of Vermont, but because Massachusetts v. EPA was decided prior to
this court’s decision, it ultimately became the foundation for much of the
Crombie analysis.105
B. Decision of the Court
In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge v. Crombie, the United States
District court addressed two issues relating directly to the possibility of the
Vermont regulations being preempted by federal law.  The court first
considered whether regulations for automobile emissions pollution under the
waiver provision of the CAA were equivalent to federal regulations for the
99. The defendants are: George Crombie, Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources; Jeffrey Wennberg, Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Environmental
Conservation; and Richard Valentinetti, Director of the Air Pollution Control Division of the
Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation.  Id. at 295.  The defendants-intervenors
are:  Conservation Law Foundation; Sierra Club; Natural Resources Defense Council;
Environmental Defense, Vermont Public Interest Research Group; State of New York; and
Denise M. Sheehan, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Environmental Conservation
of the State of New York.  Id.
100. Id. at 301.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 302.
103. Id. at 301; see also Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, No. CV F 04-6663
AWI LJO, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007).
104. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 301; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
105. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 307-10. 
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purpose of preemption analysis.   If the waiver was considered equivalent to106
a federal regulation, it would become part of the “regulatory backdrop against
which NHTSA must design maximum feasible fuel economy levels,” and thus,
the issue of preemption under the EPCA would be moot.107
The court held that “once [the] EPA issues a waiver for a California
emissions standard, it becomes a motor vehicle standard of the government,
with the same stature as a federal regulation with regard to determining
maximum feasible average fuel economy under EPCA.”   The regulations on108
fuel economy set by the EPCA and the regulations on automobile emissions
pollution were intended to coexist and occupy overlapping fields of
regulation.   Referencing Massachusetts v. EPA , the court cited repeated109
congressional recognition of the interplay between fuel economy and
automobile emissions pollution and decided that Congress could not have
intended that an EPA granted waiver operate as anything less than a federal
regulation.110
Because the court decided the waiver constituted a federal regulation, the
court considered a second issue: whether the state regulation was preempted
by the EPCA or CAA.  This issue was settled because Massachusetts v. EPA
established that automobile emission pollution regulations of the CAA exist
concurrently and overlap with the EPCA fuel economy standards without
preemption of either federal law.   Nevertheless, the court addressed the111
second issue for two reasons: “one, the express language of the EPCA’s
preemption provision appears literally to forbid the enactment or enforcement
of Vermont’s [greenhouse gas (GHG)] regulation; and two, Plaintiffs have
alleged that the GHG regulation actually conflicts with the EPCA’s fuel
economy standards.”   The court then applied the standard preemption112
analysis to Vermont’s automobile emissions pollution regulations to determine
whether the regulation would be found preempted if on appeal the regulation
was considered a state regulation rather than an “other motor vehicle
standard[] of the Government.”113
Express preemption is the most obvious preemption issue applicable to the
Vermont automobile emissions pollution regulations because the EPCA
106. Id. at 343. 
107. Id. at 344.
108. Id. at 347.
109. Id. at 344.
110. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 350.
113. Id. at 344 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000), requiring NHTSA consideration of
other federal standards when setting maximum feasible average fuel economy standards).
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includes a statutory preemption clause.  Beginning with the presumption
against preemption, the court acknowledged that the “regulation of air
pollution from mobile sources was traditionally a state responsibility.”   The114
overlapping spheres of authority involved in cooperative federalism required
finding that the Vermont regulation could not be preempted unless Congress
had the “clear and manifest purpose to do so.”   The first step of the court’s115
analysis of the preemption issue focused on the plain language of the express
preemption provision within the EPCA.116
The preemption provision at issue prohibits any state from establishing fuel
economy standards or any standards “related to” fuel economy standards.  117
Although the emission standards may affect fuel economy, they are not
primarily fuel economy standards.   The court found that there was a118
correlation, but the fact that manufacturers may have to improve fuel economy
to comply with the standard does not per se convert the standard into a fuel
economy regulation.   There are alternatives for complying with the standard,119
such as alternative fuels, new technology, and the ability to purchase credits
from other automobile makers who exceed the goals set by the regulation.  120
The court concluded that there is no persuasive evidence that the “regulation
is a de facto fuel economy standard.”121
Additionally, the court reasoned that the regulation is not “related to” fuel
economy within the meaning of the statute because such an interpretation
violates congressional intent.   Recognizing the need to limit “related to” in122
some reasonable manner, the court analyzes the EPCA and the waiver
provisions’ underlying objectives.   The court determined that the EPCA was123
enacted as an energy conservation statute without independent environmental
significance outside of the energy crisis.   The preemption clause was124
included to achieve uniformity with a national standard for fuel economy
standards.   The automobile emissions pollution regulations adopted under125
the California waiver provisions are primarily environmental legislation aimed
at reducing smog and the emission of greenhouse gases that cause global
114. Id. at 350.
115. Id. at 351.
116. Id.
117. 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).
118. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 342.
121. Id. at 353.
122. Id. at 353-54.
123. Id. 
124. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (2000).
125. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
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warming.   The court concluded that Congress realized there was a “backdrop126
of other regulations that affected motor vehicles and could have an effect on
fuel economy” and chose to enact the EPCA regardless.   Prior to127
recodification, language in the EPCA specifically included regulations adopted
in California through the CAA waiver as regulations to be considered when
setting CAFE standards.   Although the language was removed during128
recodification, Congress specifically stated that the recodification should make
no substantive changes in the statute.   The combination of these factors led129
the court to conclude that Congress had not expressly preempted the California
waiver regulations through either the CAA or the EPCA.130
The court then considered the possibility of field preemption and quickly
concluded that there was no clear or manifest intent of Congress to occupy the
area of automobile emission regulation exclusively.   In Massachusetts v.131
EPA, the United States Supreme Court held that the regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions from automobiles is not reserved exclusively for the United
States Department of Transportation through the EPCA.   Carbon dioxide132
and greenhouse gases qualify as pollutants that the EPA is required to regulate
under the CAA in order to protect public health and welfare.   Consequently,133
the Crombie court concluded that “the Congressional regulatory scheme to
improve fuel economy does not express so dominant or pervasive a federal
interest that EPA-approved state regulation is precluded.”134
The court then addressed the applicability of conflict preemption between
state regulations under the waiver and the objectives of the EPCA.   The135
waiver regulations would be impermissible through conflict preemption if they
conflict seriously with the EPCA or stand “as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”   Conflict preemption requires finding more than mere tension136
between legislation and more than different objectives; it requires an actual
intrusion on congressional objectives by the state law.   The plaintiffs in137
126. Id. at 370 n.76.
127. Id. at 354.
128. Id.
129. S. REP. NO. 103-265, at 1 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 103-180, at 1 (1993) as reprinted in
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 818.
130. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
131. Id. at 355.




136. Id. (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987)).
137. Id. at 356.
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Crombie argued that the recently adopted Vermont regulations frustrated
congressional intent to maintain a single, nationwide fuel economy standard;
that it negatively impacts the automobile industry, consumer choice, traffic
safety and employment; and that the EPA’s waiver process would not ensure
the absence of a conflict with the EPCA objectives.   The court addressed138
each of these claims and found that there was no impermissible conflict
between the state law and the EPCA’s purpose.139
The Crombie court considered the possibility that the regulations under the
CAA waiver prevented a nationwide fuel economy standard as intended by
Congress through the EPCA.   The legislative history of both the EPCA and140
the CAA indicate that Congress recognized the existing statutory overlap and
intended for the legislation to work concurrently, as evidenced by the directive
under the EPCA for the NHTSA to consider “other motor vehicle standards of
the Government” when setting its fuel economy standards.   Although fuel141
economy and emission regulations may intersect in many ways, the NHTSA
and the EPA have recognized the overlap from the beginning and have
consistently worked together to analyze the effects of emissions control
standards and fuel economy standards.   The legislative history, the142
congressional acknowledgment of the possibility of overlap, and the EPA’s
history of working together with the NHTSA to develop standards for
emissions and fuel economy led the court to find that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove conflict between a congressional intent to maintain a national fuel
economy standard and the automobile emission pollution regulations enacted
under the CAA waiver.143
The majority of the evidence produced at trial related to the plaintiffs’
contention that the regulations adopted under the CAA waiver conflicted
impermissibly with the technological feasibility and economic practicability
required under the EPCA.   The court in Crombie evaluated the expert144
testimony produced by both the automobile industry and the state.   Both145
sides presented the history of technology-forcing regulations, including
successes and failures.   The abundant materials produced for the court’s146
consideration were “detailed, technical and complex, and addressed the
138. Id.
139. Id. at 398.
140. Id. at 356.
141. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000)).
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 356-57.
144. Id. at 356; see supra Part II.C.
145. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 357.
146. Id. at 358.
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advantages and disadvantages of the regulation, and its impact on consumers,
workers, drivers and passengers, specific companies, the automobile industry
as a whole, the international community, and the planet.”   After a lengthy147
and in-depth examination of the evidence presented, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to show that compliance with the
regulation adopted by Vermont is unfeasible and that it impermissibly conflicts
with the factors mandated by the EPCA.   The court concluded that148
consumers, the automobile industry, and the economy as a whole would adapt
to changes resulting from the adopted California regulations and held that the
adopted regulations did not impermissibly conflict with the EPCA.  149
Therefore, the court held that federal law did not preempt regulations adopted
under the CAA waiver provisions, regardless of whether the regulations are
considered federal or state law.150
IV. Analysis
The significance of the Crombie decision is twofold.  First, by holding that
CAA waivers constitute federal law, the court supports a creative and powerful
tool that Congress provided to states within the cooperative federalism system
of automobile air pollution regulation.  Second, the court correctly applied a
thorough preemption analysis and concluded that the regulations adopted by
Vermont under the CAA waiver provision are not preempted, regardless of
whether they are considered federal law or EPA-approved state law.  The
Vermont court in Crombie  wisely relied heavily on congressional intent and151
the plain language of the CAA and the EPCA in a persuasive decision capable
of withstanding the in-depth scrutiny of appellate review.
A. The Success of Automobile Air Pollution Regulation in the Cooperative
Federalism System
The holding in Crombie exemplifies the best possible arrangement of a
federally mandated minimum regulation with a strong alternative reserved by
the states to “supplement or exceed federally established goals or standards.”  152
This cooperative federalism has proven to be the most successful method for
handling environmental regulation.  Cooperative federalism enables both the
147. Id. at 357.
148. Id. at 392.
149. Id. at 398-99.
150. Id. at 398.
151. 508 F. Supp. 2d 295.
152. Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 721 (2006).
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federal and state governments to play important roles.  The federal government
typically retains primary standard-setting authority for environmental
regulations, and the role of “implementing the federal standards or in
supplementing the federal regulatory initiatives” remains with the states.  153
While the federal government establishes a uniform, national standard, most
major environmental statutes explicitly reserve authority for states to adopt
more stringent standards than the federal minimum.   This structure forces154
each state to provide a certain degree of environmental regulation while
encouraging states to take further protective action through the establishment
of stricter standards.   Through cooperative federalism, federal standards155
serve as a floor, rather than a ceiling.   The federal floor prevents states from156
“compet[ing] with one another to attract new business by adopting
increasingly lenient controls on activities with potentially damaging
environmental effects.”   Conversely, the lack of a federal ceiling preserves157
state autonomy by providing states with some discretion in how to strengthen
environmental protection within their borders.  There are several reasons that158
cooperative federalism is the preferred method of management of
environmental legislation, but these reasons are accompanied by flaws specific
to the system.  159
One major problem with cooperative federalism is that the federal
government establishes the automobile pollution standards with little input
from the states.   The federal standards will only be as strict and protective160
of the environment as the current EPA administration wants the standards to
be.   Consequently, environmental regulation largely depends upon the161
EPA’s willingness to regulate effectively, which often depends more on
political pressure than the science of environmental protection.   For instance,162
many criticized the EPA during the presidency of George W. Bush for its
reluctance to regulate industry and protect the environment effectively—with
some critics claiming the EPA was in fact working to protect industry and
153. Id. at 740.
154. Id. at 743.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 740.
158. Id. at 743.
159. Scott Josephson, This Dog Has Teeth . . . Cooperative Federalism and Environmental
Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 109, 112-14 (2005).
160. Id. at 114-15.
161. Glicksman, supra note 152, at 740.
162. Chris Mhyrom, From the Trenches: What Hath Bush Wrought for the Environmental
Lawyer in Private Practice? Or Much Can-Do About Nothing, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 29, 40
(2003).
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deregulate environmental protection.   One frequently cited example is the163
EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gases despite the scientifically supported
causal connection with global warming.   The refusal compelled a group of164
states, local governments, and private organizations to sue the EPA in
Massachusetts v. EPA to force the Bush administration to regulate greenhouse
gases under the CAA.   Although the states were successful, the victory does165
not ensure that the EPA will set standards that the states consider sufficient.  166
In many instances, federal pollution control laws “put the federal government
. . . in the driver’s seat” when setting national environmental policy.  167
Crombie supplies states with a mechanism to regain some control from the
federal government through the waiver provisions of the CAA.
Cooperative federalism requires that the federal government adopt uniform
national minimum environmental standards to prevent states from adopting
increasingly more lenient regulations because of political pressure from
industry.   The national minimum “[guarantees] a minimum level of168
environmental protection to all Americans, regardless of their state of
residence, and a minimum level of environmental restraints for businesses,
regardless of where they decide to locate or relocate.”   But many states are169
demanding more than the minimum environmental protection guaranteed by
the national standard as they face the potential effects of global warming on
their states and citizens.   Crombie protects the ability of states to get more170
than the minimum guarantee by utilizing the CAA waiver provisions.  The
decision acknowledges that Congress intended for California to establish
stricter standards than the federal standards in order to address a particular
problem with automobile emission pollution.   Applying congressional intent171
to the clear language of both the CAA and the EPCA, the court correctly
concludes that Congress created the waiver provisions as a creative solution
163. Id.; see also Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under
Bush II, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 2 (2004).
164. Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 27
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 281, 282 (2003).
165. 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007).  Vermont was one of the twelve state plaintiffs in this case,
along with California, Connecticutt, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington.  Id. at 505 n.2.
166. Josephson, supra note 159, at 124.
167. Glicksman, supra note 152, at 740.
168. Id. at 736.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 779-80.




to the possibility of an insufficient federal standard.   California may172
continue to enact the strong and innovative environmental protection laws that
earned them a special waiver provision initially, and other states will benefit
from California’s leadership through the ability to adopt California’s more
stringent standard.  The court’s decision in Crombie empowers those states
who seek more environmental regulation of automobile emission pollution to
gain stricter environmental policy without creating the possibility of fifty
different standards emerging across the United States.
In the alternative, states are not required to exceed the federal minimum
standard by adopting California’s more stringent, environmentally conscious
approach.  The waiver provision is merely an option for those states that desire
more environmental protection than the nationally mandated minimum
regulations.  California chooses to enact strict legislation to address specific
environmental problems resulting from its high number of motor vehicles and
high levels of greenhouse gas emissions.  On the opposite end of the spectrum,
the less populous State of Vermont chooses to adopt the strict standards as part
of a comprehensive program to reduce Vermont’s contribution to global
warming despite already capturing more greenhouse gases than it produces and
having a relatively light “global environmental footprint.”   The reason for173
choosing to adopt the waiver may vary considerably, as it does for California
and Vermont, but it ultimately remains a choice for states to make individually
based on local environmental issues, local political ideals, and without
pressure from the national government.  In order for cooperative federalism to
be successful, states need some input in the environmental policy of their
state.   The waiver, as interpreted by the court in Crombie, provides the174
necessary opportunity for states to seek higher levels of environmental
protection without forcing states that want or need less protection to do more
than the federally required minimum—cooperative federalism operating at its
best.
B. CAA Waivers Are Not Preempted When the Waivers Constitute Federal
or State Law
In order to uphold the waivers as important mechanisms of cooperative
federalism, the Crombie court addressed the automobile industry’s argument
that the waivers were preempted by the EPCA both by the express terms of its
172. Id.
173. James H. Douglas, Governor, Vt., Third Inaugural Address, The Vermont Way
Forward (Jan. 4, 2007), available at http://governor.vt.cdc.nicusa.com/sites/gov/files/speeches/
Inaugural-Address-2007.pdf; see Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
174. Josephson, supra note 159, at 124-25.
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preemption provision and by implication.   To determine which type of175
preemption applied to the waivers, the court in Crombie initially concluded
that the CAA waivers constituted federal law under the CAA and relative to
the EPCA.   Considering the waivers as federal law possibly preempted by176
other federal law, the court’s preemption analysis found insufficient conflict
to consider the waiver preempted by the language of the EPCA.   Despite177
holding that the waivers constituted federal law, the court continued the
preemption analysis by considering what the status of the waiver would be if
it was considered a state law.   Once again, the court found that the waiver,178
even if a state regulation, was not preempted by the EPCA.   From both179
perspectives, the decision relied heavily on the congressional intent behind the
CAA and the EPCA, along with the recent Supreme Court decision of
Massachusetts v. EPA, to uphold the waiver and refuse to preempt the
legislation unnecessarily because of inevitable overlap.
1. Unavoidable Interplay Between the CAA’s Emissions Regulations and
the EPCA’s Fuel Economy Standards
Based on the reasons for the waiver and the reasons for the CAA, the
Crombie court concluded that Congress “could not have intended that an EPA-
approved emissions reduction regulation . . . not have the force of a federal
regulation.”   When Congress initially granted the CAA waiver, it was given180
specifically to California alone because of the state’s “uniquely severe air
pollution problems and a burgeoning number and concentration of
automobiles” along with its history of setting strict standards for the
automobile industry.   As Congress extended the waiver to other states and181
began to consider the relationship between the waivers and other federal
statutes, Congress acknowledged the high probability of conflict between
emission regulations and fuel economy.   Despite the potential for conflict,182
Congress continued to strengthen the waiver giving “California the broadest
possible discretion” in setting regulations and encouraging the state to
maintain its position as a pioneer in automobile emission pollution
175. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
176. Id. at 343-44, 347.
177. Id. at 345, 350.
178. Id. at 350.
179. Id. at 398.
180. Id. at 347.
181. Id. at 344 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 30,946 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Bell); 113 CONG.
REC. 30,950 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Corman)).
182. Id. at 346, 350.
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regulation.   Following the enactment of the EPCA, Congress recognized the183
potential conflict between automobile emission regulations and fuel economy,
but reaffirmed its commitment to reducing emissions particularly through
continuing to strengthen the California waiver provisions.  Preemption of184
federal law by another federal law is only available when the two laws conflict
so entirely as to make effective coexistence impossible.   The Crombie court185
examined the history of the waiver provisions and the history of the EPCA and
made the only logical conclusion available: Congress intended both pieces of
legislation to serve a particular purpose despite the possible overlap.
In addition to Congress’s repeated acknowledgement of the possible overlap
between automobile emission regulation and fuel economy, the court
examined the overall construction of the EPCA to support its finding of no
preemption.   The EPCA was enacted in response to the energy crisis of the186
1970s, and its objective remains to improve the energy efficiency of the United
States with particular emphasis placed on fuel economy of motor vehicles.  187
While the EPCA has no requirement to consider environmental factors when
setting fuel economy standards, there is a general requirement that the NHTSA
take into consideration other motor vehicle standards of the federal
government when setting the fuel economy standards.   Consequently, the188
court interpreted this mandate to mean that Congress intended the motor
vehicle regulations under the CAA to be considered, along with any
regulations adopted under the CAA waiver provisions, rather than giving the
EPCA an explicit environmental objective.   The NHTSA has historically189
considered regulations created through the CAA waiver as “other motor
vehicle standards of the Government” under the language of the EPCA, and
the court found no reason why the new regulations involving greenhouse gas
emissions should be treated any differently.   Thus, if the regulations under190
the CAA waiver provisions are found to be preempted by the EPCA, it must
be because they are impermissible state regulations.
2. Even as State Law, the Provisions Are Not Preempted by the EPCA
After concluding that the overlap between the waiver provisions and the
EPCA is permissible as between federal regulations, the court in Crombie
183. Id. at 345.
184. Id. at 346.
185. Id. at 343-44, 350.
186. Id. at 345-46.
187. Id. at 305-06.
188. Id. at 346.
189. Id. at 347.
190. Id. at 346.
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extended its analysis to address the preemption possibility if the adopted
regulations under the CAA waiver are considered state law by a reviewing
court.   Interestingly, analysis of the waiver provisions as constituting state191
law was not drastically different from the analysis of the provisions as
constituting federal law.  The court once again looked to legislative history and
congressional intent as its touchstone in determining whether there was
sufficient reason to preempt the regulations adopted under the waiver.   And192
once again, the court reached the conclusion that there is no impermissible
conflict that justifies preempting the regulations adopted by Vermont.  193
Neither the EPCA’s plain language, nor its legislative history, indicates any
express preemption of the adopted automobile emission regulations.   States194
are expressly prohibited from passing any law “related to” fuel economy
standards, but the court prudently limited its interpretation of “related to”
rather than “ignore decades of EPA-issued and approved regulations that also
can be said to ‘relate to’ fuel economy.”   The express preemption clause195
within the EPCA governs standards that are solely related to fuel economy
with no other objective, and the purpose of regulating automobile emission
pollution is not the type of regulation intended to be preempted by the
EPCA.196
The plaintiffs’ arguments for field preemption and conflict preemption were
equally unsuccessful.   Field preemption was easily dismissed because the197
CAA waivers under the EPA and the EPCA have entirely distinguishable
objectives, neither of which interfere with “so dominant or pervasive a federal
interest” that the other is precluded.   The regulations adopted under the CAA198
waiver also survive the court’s thorough conflict preemption analysis.  199
Along with the many rulings of fact, the court considered the possibility of
irreconcilable conflict between Vermont’s adopted regulations under the CAA
waiver and a federal fuel economy standard.   And once again, the legislative200
history provided the support necessary for the adopted regulations under the
CAA waiver to avoid preemption.  Congress designed the CAA waiver
provisions to “foster California’s role as a laboratory for motor vehicle
191. Id. at 350.
192. Id. 




197. Id. at 355-57.
198. Id. at 355.
199. Id. at 392.
200. Id. at 356.
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emission control, in order ‘to continue the national benefits that might flow
from allowing California to continue to act as a pioneer in this field.’”201
By giving this opportunity to California alone, the CAA effectively
preempts forty-nine states from setting their own unique standards and
establishes a maximum of two standards for automobile emission pollution
regulation regardless of how many states choose to adopt the California
regulations.   Although there are two possible standards for automobile202
emission pollution regulation, the national fuel economy standard remains the
sole fuel economy standard as there is no provision within the EPCA allowing
any state to set its own fuel economy standard, and the court found that the
waiver under the CAA does not qualify or even “relate to” a fuel economy
standard.   Ultimately, without finding an impermissible conflict with the203
EPCA, the court in Crombie concluded that the regulations adopted by
Vermont under the CAA waiver provisions avoid preemption in any form.204
V. Conclusion
Although the future of Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep vs.
Crombie and the CAA waiver’s status to Vermont as well as other states
remains uncertain, the significance of the district court’s decision quickly
became apparent.  Following the Vermont court’s decision, the California case
addressing preemption of the regulations adopted under the CAA waiver relied
heavily on the Crombie court’s reasoning and analysis and reached the same
conclusion.   While it is possible, if not likely, that the automobile industry205
will appeal the decisions in both Vermont and California, the Crombie
decision provides a persuasive and relevant precedent.  In the early litigation
of an issue that has the potential to reach the United States Supreme Court,
Vermont, a state capturing more greenhouse gases than it produces and with
fewer registered motor vehicles than any other state, established itself as a
forerunner in the growing response to global warming and proved ready to
actively participate in the cooperative federalism of environmental
regulation.   While this may be only the beginning of an extended legal206
201. Ashley Morris Bale, The Newest Frontier in Motor Vehicle Emission Control: The
Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 222 (1995).
202. Carlson, supra note 164, at 311.
203. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
204. Id. at 398.
205. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
206. Michael Regan, Climate Battle Reaches Vermont: Suit Pits Automakers,
Environmentalists, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Mar. 23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
5504324.
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battle, Crombie offers Vermont and other states the power to steer
environmental policy and forces a lax EPA into the backseat.
Sarah E. Leatherwood
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